CONSUMER RIGHTS ARE GIG WORKERS’ RIGHTS?
REGULATING THE GIG ECONOMY AT THE INTERSECTION
OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW AND EMPLOYMENT LAW
David Kaplan*
I. INTRODUCTION
Toño Solís trudged through the teeming rain, through rapidly
flooding city streets.1 Elsewhere in the city, riders were evacuated from
subway cars that were inundated with storm runoff.2 In all, the storm,
which was a remnant of Hurricane Ida, claimed the lives of at least
forty-three people in the New York-New Jersey metropolitan area.3
Solís completed his night’s work with a trip from Brooklyn to Queens,
at 9:30 p.m., as conditions deteriorated even further.4 One might
wonder what sort of work Toño Solís does that subjects him to these
life-threatening conditions. Solís, like so many others working in 2021,
is a gig worker and delivers food for an app-based delivery service.5
Although one would think that he was paid handsomely for risking his
life that night, Solís made just $5 for that last trip to Queens, and $115
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for the night—$12 per hour and substantially less than the city’s $15
minimum wage.6
The minimum wage does not apply to gig workers like Toño
because they are largely independent contractors.7 Nor do most gig
workers receive paid sick time, health care, or workers’ compensation.8
To offer at least some protections for these workers, government
regulators have turned to an area of law traditionally concerned with
the rights of consumers rather than providers of services—consumer
protection law.9 Because these laws include broad definitions of
consumers, along with strong private rights of action with real
monetary penalties, consumer protection laws can provide some
redress for workers where traditional employment law remedies may
be out of reach.10
In Part II, this Comment will provide a brief history of the gig
economy with descriptions of different gig workers, their current status
in most jurisdictions as independent contractors, and the implication
of that classification for employment rights and regulatory
enforcement. Part III will describe the history of consumer protection
law and then transition into the trend of regulators using these laws to
enforce what have traditionally been employment rights. With clever
interpretation and application, these laws have been adapted to
protect gig workers as “consumers” of gig economy platforms where
companies have engaged in unfair or deceptive business practices—
the traditional offenses policed by consumer protection law. Unfair
practices, where an actor in commerce takes advantage of their
customer, and deceptive practices, where one lies or gives a
misrepresentation about a product or service, can be applicable to
common issues in employment, like nonpayment of wages, unsafe
working conditions, and other transgressions.11
6

Id.
See Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 806 (6th Cir. 2015).
8
See, e.g., Chris Benner et al., On-demand and On-the-edge: Ride-hailing and Delivery
Workers in San Francisco, U. CAL. SANTA CRUZ INST. FOR SOC. TRANSFORMATION (May 5,
2020),
https://transform.ucsc.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/OnDemand-nOntheEdge_MAY2020.pdf; MARIA FIGUEROA ET AL., ESSENTIAL BUT UNPROTECTED: APPBASED FOOD COURIERS IN NEW YORK CITY 15 (2021), https://img1.wsimg.com/blobby
/go/6c0bc951-f473-4720-be3e-797bd8c26b8e/091321_Full%20Los%20Deliveristas%
20Unidos%20-%20Industry.pdf.
9
See, e.g., Complaint, District of Columbia v. Doordash, Inc., No. 2019 CA 007626
B (Sup. Ct. D.C. 2020) [hereinafter Doordash Complaint].
10
See infra Part III.
11
See 15 U.S.C. § 45.
7
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Finally, Part IV will highlight the important features of consumer
protection statutes that allow them to be used this way, some common
pitfalls found in state statutes and how they can be fixed, as well as
discuss some of the other pros and cons of the regulatory scheme. This
Comment will show that consumer protection law should continue to
be used as a tool to regulate the gig economy where traditional
employment law may be inapplicable. These laws, with minimal
changes to expand consumer definitions and enhance private causes
of actions, can be a tool in the regulator’s toolbox to enforce workplace
standards. Finally, Part V is the conclusion of the Comment.
A. The Gig Economy
The “gig economy” is made up of workers offering their services
on a for-hire or freelance basis.12 In the last several years, the gig
economy has exploded with platforms where these workers can
connect to purchasers of their services.13 Sources estimate that 30
percent of workers have performed some form of freelance work, while
10 percent of workers identify freelancing as their full-time job.14
Possibly portending even greater future growth, young workers—
especially those part of the Gen X and Millennial generations—have
been reported to be freelancing at high rates.15

12

See Gig Economy, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/g/gigeconomy.asp (last updated Mar. 31, 2022).
13
See Sydney Brownstone, Gig Economy Explosion: 53 Million American Freelancers Are
Their Own Bosses, FAST CO. (Sept. 5, 2014), https://www.fastcompany.com/3035325
/gig-economy-explosion-53-million-american-freelancers-are-their-own-bosses
(“According to a new survey commissioned by Freelancers Union and Elance-oDesk,
freelance workers make up 53 million people, or 34% of the American workforce.”);
Richard Partington, Gig Economy in Britain Doubles, Accounting for 4.7 Million Workers,
THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2019, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business
/2019/jun/28/gig-economy-in-britain-doubles-accounting-for-47-million-workers.
14
Paul Davidson, Classifying Workers as Independent Contractors Is Now Tougher After a
Trump-era Rule Is Dropped, U.S.A. TODAY (May 21, 2021, 11:58 AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2021/05/05/independent-contractorruling-makes-tougher-call-workers-contractors/4956332001.
15
A report by the company Upwork found that 53 percent of Gen Z workers
reported freelancing, while 40 percent of Millennials responded that they had
freelanced. Press Release, Upwork, Sixth Annual “Freelancing in America” Study
Finds That More People Than Ever See Freelancing as a Long-term Career Path (Oct.
3, 2019), https://www.upwork.com/press/releases/freelancing-in-america-2019.
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Gig-work companies argue that their workers prefer flexibility and
work less than regular full-time workers.16 Recent studies of gig
workers, however, have found the opposite. A study of over 600 San
Francisco-based gig workers found that 71 percent worked more than
thirty hours per week, with 50 percent responding that they worked
more than forty hours, and 30 percent responding that they worked
more than fifty hours weekly.17 A 2021 study of app-based delivery
workers found that 81 percent of workers surveyed said they worked
five or more days, and 64 percent responded that they work six or seven
days a week.18
Debates and legal fights about how these workers should be
classified are ubiquitous.19 Scholarship on the issue is also extensive,
with many arguing that gig workers are misclassified as independent
contractors, leaving them vulnerable to abuse.20 These debates have

16

See Tony Xu, Building the Future of Work, Right Now, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 29, 2020,
8:04
AM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/prop-22-freelance-uber-door-dasheconomy-gig-workers-2020-11 (“91% of [Doordash workers] work fewer than 10 hours
per week, with an average of four or fewer hours. More than 4 out of 5 [Doordash
workers] say that gig work is not their main source of income, and more than 3 out of
4 [Doordash workers] say they have another job or are in school.”).
17
Benner et al., supra note 8, at 21.
18
ESSENTIAL BUT UNPROTECTED, supra note 8, at 17.
19
See e.g., Travis Clark, The Gig Is Up: An Analysis of the Gig-Economy and an Outdated
Worker Classification System in Need of Reform, 19 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 769 (2021); Hasmik
Petrosian, Uber and Beyond: A System for Regulating Gig-Businesses Without Destroying Them,
41 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 87 (2018).
20
Scholars have also suggested numerous solutions for the alleged
misclassification issue. See Orly Lobel, We Are All Gig Workers Now: Online Platforms,
Freelancers & the Battles Over Employment Status & Rights During the COVID-19 Pandemic;
57 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 919, 943–44 (2020) (arguing for the expansion of employment
law protections as well as social safety net benefits to gig workers just as these were
expanded on an emergency basis during the COVID-19 pandemic); Keith
Cunningham-Parmeter, Gig-Dependence: Finding the Real Independent Contractors of
Platform Work, 39 N. Ill. U. L. Rev. 379, 384 (2019) (stating that the ABC test is the
appropriate test for evaluating modern day gig work); Naomi B. Sunshine, Employees as
Price-Takers, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 105, 110 (2018) (proposing a rebuttable
presumption that workers who cannot set the price of their services are employees);
Brishen Rogers, Employment Rights in the Platform Economy: Getting Back to Basics, 10
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 479, 483 (2016) (arguing that gig workers’ employment status
should be tested under principals of employer dominance, and as applied to Uber,
asserting that Uber drivers are employees). But see Eric A. Posner, The Economic Basis
of the Independent Contractor/Employee Distinction, 100 TEX. L. REV. 353, 353 (2021)
(asserting that gig workers are properly classified as independent contractors because
they do not require the protections of employment and labor law because their work
is “not subject to labor monopsony”).
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serious implications for both the workers, who may be entitled to more
rights and benefits, and for companies, who benefit from low labor
costs in the current model and take on less liability.21 Independent
contractors typically do not qualify for paid sick leave laws, nor receive
paid sick leave from gig work employers.22 Additionally, gig economy
platforms typically do not provide employer-sponsored health care
plans.23 Even more troubling, the study found that “45% [of gig
workers] couldn’t handle a $400 emergency payment without
borrowing.”24
Moreover, gig-work employers have created a plethora of
regulatory challenges for local governments. For instance, Uber and
similar companies have sidestepped the traditional taxi and for-hire
car service regulations at the expense of entrenched taxi interests.25
21
See, e.g., Richard Reibstein, Déjà Vu in the Independent Contractor Misclassification
Arena: August 2021 News Update, JD SUPRA (Sept. 15, 2021), https://www.jdsupra.com
/legalnews/deja-vu-in-the-independent-contractor-5497740 (collecting recent worker
classification law suits); Dori Goldstein & Ricard Pochkhanawala, ANALYSIS: GigWorker Classification Battles Spread to New Fronts, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 16, 2020, 4:52 AM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/bloomberg-law-analysis/analysis-gig-workerclassification-battles-spread-to-new-fronts; Shira Ovide, Gig Work Is Risky for Apps, Too,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/11/technology/gigwork-business-model.html; Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Massachusetts Sues
Uber and Lyft Over the Status of Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.
com/2020/07/14/technology/massachusetts-sues-uber-lyft.html; see also Independent
Contractors, WORKPLACE FAIRNESS, https://www.workplacefairness.org/independentcontractors#2 (last visited Sept. 29, 2022); Noam Scheiber, Uber and Lyft Ramp Up
Legislative Efforts to Shield Business Model, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2021), https://www.
nytimes.com/2021/06/09/business/economy/uber-lyft-gig-workers-new-york.html
(“Gig companies like Uber and Lyft have long resisted classifying workers as
employees, stating in regulatory filings that doing so would force them to alter their
business model and risk a financial hit.”).
22
See, e,g., N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND WORKER PROT., PAID SAFE AND SICK
LEAVE LAW: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 8 (2020), https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca
/downloads/pdf/about/PaidSickLeave-FAQs.; Erin Mulvaney, Uber Drivers Say Lack of
Sick Pay Shows Need for Employee Status, BLOOMBERG L. (July 14, 2020, 3:14 PM),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/uber-drivers-say-lack-of-sick-payshows-need-for-employee-status.
23
See Benner et al., supra note 8, at 18.
24
Id. at 16.
25
Fran Spielman, Alderman Accuses Uber, Lyft of ‘Predatory Fares,’ Wants Price Cap
Imposed, CHI. SUN TIMES (May 24, 2021, 3:13 PM), https://chicago.suntimes.com/cityhall/2021/5/24/22451667/uber-lyft-ride-share-hailing-surge-pricing-cap-city-councilordinance-alderman-reilly-taxi-cabs (reporting politician’s argument that “the
[Chicago] City Council allowed the ride-hailing industry to ‘operate under less
restrictive rules’ than cabs — without first obtaining livery licenses from the city. That
allowed thousands of ride-hailing drivers to ‘flood the market.’”).
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Gig-work employers themselves argue that the “current employment
system is outdated and unfair,” and “America needs to change the
status quo to protect all workers, not just one type of work.”26 Uber’s
CEO, Dara Khosrowshahi, further argued that simply classifying
drivers as employees would cause rides to become more expensive,
leading to a reduction in customers due to heightened costs.27
Additionally, Khosrowshahi stated that the employee classification
would take away “the flexibility [that drivers] have today . . . .”28 Critics,
however, respond that flexibility can still be achieved in the employeeemployer framework. Further, they argue that gig-work companies say
that workers sacrifice pay for flexibility, when instead workers take the
gig work due to a lack of other better paid traditional jobs.29 Others
challenge that large gig-work employers deserve minimum wage
exemptions, which otherwise apply to most other businesses.30
B. Consumer Protection Law
With employment law not covering gig workers, some
government regulators have turned to consumer protection law to fill
in this enforcement gap. One prominent federal law used in this
manner, which has also been replicated on the state level, is the
Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTCA”).31 The FTCA prohibits
“[u]nfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and unfair
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce . . . .”32 While
“unfair” or “deceptive” may seem synonymous, they are two distinct
violations of the law.33 Deceptive acts involve providing false or
misleading information to consumers:34 “To prove a deceptive act or
practice under § 5(a)(1), the FTC must show three elements: (1) a
26

Dara Khosrowshahi, I Am the C.E.O. of Uber. Gig Workers Deserve Better, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/10/opinion/uber-ceo-darakhosrowshahi-gig-workers-deserve-better.html.
27
Id.
28
Id.
29
LINA MOE ET. AL., THE MAGNITUDE OF LOW-PAID GIG AND INDEPENDENT CONTRACT
WORK IN NEW YORK STATE 21 (2020), http://www.centernyc.org/the-magnitude-of-lowpaid-gig-and-independent-contract-work-in-new-york-state.
30
Miriam A. Cherry, Beyond Misclassification: The Digital Transformation of Work, 37
COMP. LAB. L. & POL’Y J. 577, 586 (2016).
31
15 U.S.C. § 45.
32
Id. § 45(a)(1).
33
See CHRISTOPHER JAY HOOFNAGLE, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION PRIVACY LAW AND
POLICY 37–38, 50 (2016).
34
Id.
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representation, omission, or practice, that (2) is likely to mislead
consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and (3) the
representation, omission, or practice is material.”35
Unfair acts cover instances where companies take advantage of
consumers, but not necessarily through false information or lies—for
instance, through unethical contract terms or intimidating highpressure sales tactics; whereas deceptive acts are acts which involve
providing false or misleading information to consumers.36 The FTC
must show that: (1) the act or practice causes “substantial injury to
consumers”; (2) consumers cannot “reasonably avoid[]” the injury;
and (3) the consumer injury is “not outweighed” by its “benefits to
consumers or to competition.”37 The statute provides that the FTC
“may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered
with all other evidence,” but “[s]uch public policy considerations may
not serve as a primary basis for such determination.”38 The unfair
practice language is broad and inclusive of “unfair practices that have
not yet been contemplated by more specific laws.”39
“The [FTCA] is drafted broadly to include not only traditional
anti-trust violations but also ‘practices that the Commission determines
are against public policy for other reasons.’”40 As the Court
highlighted in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., “the proscriptions in § 5 are
flexible, ‘to be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases from
the field of business.’”41
Scholars have argued, however, that the unfairness prong has
been underutilized in consumer enforcement actions.42 They have
termed the FTC’s tendency to bring deceptive acts charges to
violations more conventionally understood as “unfair” to be
“deception-creep.”43 Deception-creep is in part attributed to the

35
FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2016) (citing FTC v.
Verity Int’l, Ltd., 443 F.3d 48, 63 (2d Cir. 2006)).
36
Id.
37
15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
38
Id.
39
FTC v. Accusearch Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009).
40
LeadClick Media, 838 F.3d at 167–68 (quoting FTC v. Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476
U.S. 447, 454 (1986)).
41
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1965) (quoting FTC v.
Motion Picture Advert. Servs. Co., 344 U.S. 392, 394 (1953)).
42
See Cobun Keegan & Calli Schroeder, Unpacking Unfairness: The FTC’s Evolving
Measures of Privacy Harms, 15 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 19, 19 (2019).
43
Id.
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historic basis for the unfair prong, which was only designed to address
business-to-business anticompetition claims.44 Additionally, the FTC
did have a skirmish with Congress regarding the unfairness prong
being overly broad as applied to consumer actions. In 1978, Congress
objected to an FTC proposed ban on all advertising to children and
ultimately cut funding to the Commission.45 This proposed ban relied
on the unfairness prong and argued that targeting children was
“immoral, unscrupulous, and unethical.”46 In response to Congress,
the FTC issued its Policy Statement on Unfairness which set out the
criteria for unfairness as: “(1) whether the practice injures consumers;
(2) whether it violates established public policy; (3) whether it is
unethical or unscrupulous.”47 Congress, when it amended the FTCA
in 1994, incorporated a version of this test into the FTCA, which is the
current test of unfairness.48 While unfairness enforcement was at its
pinnacle in the 1970s, since then the FTC has instead mostly leaned
on deceptiveness in consumer cases.49
Scholars argue that since unfair practices have been expanded to
include consumer harms, and the standard has been codified, the FTC
should use this enforcement tool more frequently.50 For instance,
scholars have argued that unfair practice regulation can protect
consumers’ data privacy; and some enforcement has begun in this
area.51 While most FTC enforcement of gig-economy employment has
used deceptive acts regulation, here, too, unfairness could be better
utilized for worker protection. One similar example of how unfairness
could be used in this context is Genesco.52 There, the FTC prosecuted
a company for transferring consumers’ credit balances without
44

Id. at 21–22.
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Television Advertising to Children, 43 Fed.
Reg. 17935, 17967 (Apr. 27, 1978); Howard Beales, The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority:
Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, FTC (May 30, 2003), https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/2003/05/ftcs-use-unfairness-authority-its-rise-fall-and-resurrection.
46
The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection, supra note 45.
47
Letter from Federal Trade Commission to Senators Wendell H. Ford and John
C. Danforth (Dec. 17, 1980), https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/ftc-policystatement-unfairness.
48
15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
49
See Keegan & Schroeder, supra note 42 at 19, 23.
50
See id. at 19.
51
Id. at 24–25, 32–33; see also Dennis D. Hirsch, From Individual Control to Social
Protection: New Paradigms for Privacy Law in the Age of Predictive Analytics, 79 MD. L. REV.
439, 439 (2020).
52
In re Genesco, 89 F.T.C. 451 (1977).
45
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customer consent.53 Moreover, some have argued that “taking
advantage of pre-existing false consumer beliefs qualifies as an unfair
practice.”54 Combining these concepts, the FTC could apply this same
enforcement strategy where gig work companies impose pay
structures, which are not deceptively stated, but nonetheless still
unfair. Unfairness allows the FTC to enforce standards without a
deceptive statement as a trigger.55
Today, all fifty states have some form of consumer protection
law.56 The statutes typically mirror the FTCA and also bar unfair and
deceptive business practices, but some do not to the same extent as the
FTCA.57 Because of their similarities to the FTCA, these state statutes
are often referred to as “Little-FTC Acts.”58 That said, a key difference
between the federal and state iterations is that while all states have a
private right of action for consumers to bring suits, the FTCA does not
allow for actions to be brought by private consumers.59 But not all
private causes of action are created equal, and some are deficient
either because they do not have sufficient damages to serve as
deterrents, or they require consumers to meet high standards—which
makes succeeding on claims difficult.60
Likely attributable to its statutory flexibility, consumer protection
law has been applied to a multitude of different areas, from regulating
lenders and credit card companies to product manufacturers and
business franchisors.61 The FTC has used unfair and deceptive
53

Id. at 480.
Lauren E. Willis, Deception By Design, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 115, 177 (2020).
55
See Hirsch, supra note 51, at 479.
56
CAROLYN CARTER, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR. INC., CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE
STATES 9 (2018) [hereinafter CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES],
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/udap-report.pdf.
57
Id. at 12–13.
58
Bell v. Publix Super Mkts., Inc., 982 F.3d 468, 474 (7th Cir. 2020) (“These
statutes are known as ‘Little-FTC Acts’ because they are patterned on the Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTCA).”).
59
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES, supra note 56, at 33; 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2);
Dreisbach v. Murphy, 658 F.2d 720, 730 (9th Cir. 1981) (“The Act rests initial remedial
power solely in the Federal Trade Commission.”).
60
See N.Y. GEN. BUS. § 349(h) (LexisNexis 2022) (limiting treble damages to “one
thousand dollars”); CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES, supra note 56, at 38.
61
See FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2016) (“The
FTC Act is drafted broadly to include not only traditional anti-trust violations . . . .”);
Press Release, FTC, FTC Sends More than $1.7 Million in Refunds to People who Lost
Money to Student Loan Debt Relief Scam (Feb. 10, 2021), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2021/02/ftc-sends-more-17-million-refunds-people-who-lost54
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practices to punish companies for charging its customers hidden fees,
viewing their private information without consent, and
misrepresenting business opportunities.62 Of particular interest to this
Comment is how regulators have used these laws to address claims of
unfair and deceptive practices against gig workers by gig-work
companies. These claims, which include allegations of wage theft and
misrepresentation of benefits, share traits of claims historically within
the employment law sphere but are out of reach to employment
regulators due to gig workers’ classification as independent
contractors.63 While the cases have thus far centered around deceptive
acts, problems such as exploitive pay structures and hazardous working
conditions could arguably also be regulated under the unfair acts
prong of these laws.
Seemingly leaving themselves open for their workers to be
classified as consumers, under consumer protection laws like the
FTCA, some gig-work companies have referred to their workers as
“consumers” of their platforms.64 Laws that allow for gig workers to be
included as consumers and have strong, private rights of action that
allow for swift resolution of these types of violations.
II. THE GIG WORKER AND WORKPLACE ENFORCEMENT
Nationwide, the battle over gig work roils, with states, the federal
government, and courts attempting to apply employment law to the
new gig economy. At times, these efforts have been met with backlash
from powerful gig-work lobbies. First, this Part will review the status of
traditional employment laws and classification fights. Then, this Part
will look at where consumer protection laws may, at least temporarily
while these fights continue, offer some redress for gig workers.
money-student; Press Release, FTC, FTC Alleges Fuel Card Marketer FleetCor Charged
Hundreds of Millions in Hidden Fees (Dec. 20, 2019), https://www.ftc.gov/newsevents/press-releases/2019/12/ftc-alleges-fuel-card-marketer-fleetcor-chargedhundreds-millions; Press Release, FTC, VIZIO to Pay $2.2 Million to FTC, State of New
Jersey to Settle Charges It Collected Viewing Histories on 11 Million Smart Televisions
without Users’ Consent (Feb. 6, 2017), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/pressreleases/2017/02/vizio-pay-22-million-ftc-state-new-jersey-settle-charges-it;
Press
Release, FTC, FTC Recovers $160,000 for Franchisees Who Bought Web Services
Businesses (May 15, 2007), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2007/05
/ftc-recovers-160000-franchisees-who-bought-web-services.
62
See sources supra note 61.
63
See, e.g., Complaint at 1, FTC v. Amazon, Inc., No. C-4746 (F.T.C. 2021)
[hereinafter Amazon Complaint]; Doordash Complaint, supra note 9.
64
Transcript of Summary Judgment Proceedings at 16, O’Connor v. Uber Techs.,
Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (No. C 13-3826 EMC).
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A. Traditional Employment Laws and the Classification Battle
As independent contractors, most gig workers are not eligible for
standard employment protections. Independent contractors are not
covered by the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”), which mandates a
minimum wage and overtime pay after forty hours.65 Gig workers have
reported earning as low as $7.50 per hour when factoring in
expenses.66 Nor are independent contractors protected against
employment discrimination; they are excluded by the Americans with
Disabilities Act (“ADA”), the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
(“ADEA”), and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.67 Scholars have noted
that without a mandate to provide reasonable accommodations, some
gig-work companies seem reluctant to proactively offer solutions to
accommodate differently-abled workers.68 For instance, companies are
disinterested in accommodating disabled drivers who may need hand
controls to drive or workers whose vision or hearing prevent them from
interacting with phone apps.69
Additionally, independent contractors are ineligible for many
traditional employment benefits. Independent contractors typically
do not qualify for paid sick leave.70 Lack of sick time is a particularly
grave concern in light of the COVID-19 pandemic. In New York,
rideshare drivers were some of the first casualties of the virus.71
Tragically, driver Anil Subba, a Nepalese immigrant from Queens, died
on March 24, 2020 of COVID-19 after picking up a sick passenger at
65
Keller v. Miri Microsystems LLC, 781 F.3d 799, 806 (“Under the FLSA, only
employees are entitled to overtime and minimum-wage compensation. Independent
contractors do not enjoy FLSA’s protections.”).
66
Carmen Figueroa, Opinion: We Need the Flexibility Gig Work Promises and Basic
Rights, S. SEATTLE EMERALD (Aug. 18, 2021), https://southseattleemerald.com/2021
/08/18/opinion-we-need-the-flexibility-gig-work-promises-and-basic-rights/.
67
Alexander v. Avera St. Luke’s Hosp., 768 F.3d 756, 761 (8th Cir. 2014) (showing
the exclusion of independent contractors from the ADA and ADEA); Alberty-Vélez v.
Corporación de P.R. para la Difusión Pública, 361 F.3d 1, 6 (1st Cir. 2004) (excluding
independent contractors from Title VII).
68
Paul Harpur & Peter Blanck, Gig Workers with Disabilities: Opportunities, Challenges,
and Regulatory Response, 30 J. OCCUPATIONAL REHAB. 511, 514 (2020).
69
Id.
70
See, e.g., N.Y. CITY DEP’T OF CONSUMER AND WORKER PROT., PAID SAFE AND SICK
LEAVE LAW: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 8, https://www1.nyc.gov/assets/dca
/downloads/pdf/about/PaidSickLeave-FAQs.pdf (last updated Nov. 2, 2020).
71
Jiayang Fan, The Uncertain Life of New York City’s Immigrant Uber Drivers During the
Pandemic, NEW YORKER, (Apr. 29, 2020), https://www.newyorker.com/news/dailycomment/the-uncertain-life-of-new-york-citys-immigrant-uber-drivers-during-thepandemic.

292

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:281

J.F.K. Airport.72 Moreover, gig workers handled food deliveries
throughout the pandemic, especially to those at-risk for serious
COVID-19 cases, who avoided making trips outside the home for
food.73 It is concerning that those workers may not be able to afford
to call out of work if they themselves were ill.
The fight over gig worker classification continues both federally
and at the state level. In 2019, the Trump administration’s
Department of Labor and National Labor Relations Board (NLRB)
issued opinions that gig workers on online platforms were not
employees.74 Under the National Labor Relations Act, independent
contractors are excluded from labor law protections, such as the right
to engage in protected, concerted activity to better their working
conditions.75 The Biden Administration has prioritized this status for
quick reversal.76 On December 27, 2021, the NLRB invited briefs on
the question of which test should be used to determine independent
contractor status.77
Nationwide, jurisdictions vary even on which test to apply to
determine if a worker is an employee or an independent contractor.
Some courts apply the common law “right to control” multi-factor test.
Formulations vary, but courts agree that the essence of the test is
“whether the [employer] has the right to control the manner and
means of accomplishing the [work] desired.”78 The test also typically
considers factors including:
72

Id.
See Paige Smith, People Have to Eat, Creating Boom for Food-Delivery Gig Workers,
BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 20, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report
/people-have-to-eat-creating-boom-for-food-delivery-gig-workers.
74
U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Wage and Hour Op. Letter FLSA2019-6 (Apr. 29, 2019);
Memorandum from the N.L.R.B. on the Uber Technologies, Inc., Cases 13-CA-163062,
14-CA-158833, and 29-CA-177483 (Apr. 16, 2019).
75
29 U.S.C. §§ 152 (3), 157.
76
See Independent Contractor Status Under the Fair Labor Standards Act, U.S. DEP’T
LABOR, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/whd/flsa/2021-independent-contractor (last
visited Sept. 21, 2021); Memorandum on Mandatory Submissions for Advice, Jennifer
Abruzzo, General Counsel, N.L.R.B. (Aug. 12, 2021), https://www.nlrb.gov/newsoutreach/news-story/general-counsel-jennifer-abruzzo-releases-memorandumpresenting-issue (listing as priority revisiting Trump-era Supershuttle independent
contractor test).
77
Press Release, N.L.R.B., NLRB Invites Briefs Regarding Independent Contractor
Standard (Dec. 27, 2021), https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/news-story/nlrbinvites-briefs-regarding-independent-contractor-standard.
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O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1148–49 (N.D. Cal. 2015);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503 U.S. 318, 323 (1992) (quoting Cmty. for
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[the] skill required; the source of the instrumentalities and
tools; the location of the work; the duration of the relationship between the parties; whether the hiring party has the
right to assign additional projects to the hired party; the extent of the hired party’s discretion over when and how long
to work; [and] the method of payment . . . .79
The “economic realities test” is another independent contractor
test that courts use. The economic realities test examines the totality
of circumstances and asks if the worker “depend[s] upon the business
to which they render service for the opportunity to work.”80 Put simply,
an independent contractor is one who is “in business for [themself].”81
In 2014, the NLRB adopted an economic realities-adjacent
“entrepreneurial opportunity” test, which asked if the worker was
“rendering services as part of an independent business.”82 This test,
however, was overruled in 2019 when the NLRB instead relegated
entrepreneurial opportunity to merely one factor of its common law
test.83
Finally, several states have adopted the more streamlined “ABC
test.”84 This test, as exemplified in the California formulation, puts the
burden on the employer to show: (A) the worker is not controlled or
directed by the hiring entity when performing the work; (B) the
worker performs work outside the usual course of the hiring entity’s
business; and (C) the worker is customarily engaged in an
independently established trade, occupation, or business of the same
nature as that involved in the work.85 If the employer can show all of
these elements, the worker is an independent contractor rather than
employee.86

Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 751 (1989) (noting common law test
“consider[s] the hiring party’s right to control the manner and means by which the
product is accomplished”)).
79
Darden, 503 U.S. at 323 (quoting Reid, 490 U.S. at 751).
80
Myers v. Reno Cab Co., 492 P.3d 545, 551 (Nev. 2021) (quoting Terry v. Sapphire
/Sapphire Gentlemen’s Club, 336 P.3d 951, 956 (Nev. 2014)).
81
Id. (quoting Henderson v. Inter-Chem. Coal Co., 41 F.3d 567, 570 (10th Cir.
1994)).
82
FedEx Home Delivery, 361 N.L.R.B. 55 (2014).
83
SuperShuttle DFW, Inc., 367 N.L.R.B. 75 (2019).
84
See, e.g., Assemb. B. No. 5, 2019–2020 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019); CONN. GEN.
STAT. § 31-222(a)(B)(ii) (2022); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 43:21-19(i)(6) (West 2022).
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86
Id.

294

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 53:281

At the state level, regulatory and statutory efforts to classify gig
workers as employees have faced backlash from gig-work companies.
In New Jersey, the state Department of Labor and Workforce
Development, alleging worker misclassification, has charged rideshare
companies Uber and Lyft cumulatively with hundreds of millions of
dollars in unpaid unemployment and disability insurance bills.87
Similarly, in Massachusetts, state Attorney General Maura Healey has
sued Uber and Lyft, alleging that the companies have misclassified
their workers, thereby avoiding paying workers the benefits to which
they are legally entitled.88 In a statement, the Attorney General
proclaimed that “[t]his business model is unfair and exploitative. We
are seeking this determination from the court because these drivers
have a right to be treated fairly.”89 Lyft responded through a
spokesperson that “[t]his lawsuit threatens to eliminate work for more
than 50,000 people in Massachusetts at the worst possible time.”90
New York City has passed local laws that give gig workers who work
for delivery platforms certain rights and protections such as access to
restaurant bathrooms, limits on trip distances, guarantees that tips are
paid to workers, and a minimum payment per trip to be set by January
1, 2023.91 Supporters of the bills hope that they “can serve as a
‘framework’ for other municipalities.”92 These laws, however, have
stopped short of requiring that gig workers be classified as employees.93
Much like their entrance into the markets, gig-work companies
have responded aggressively to challenges to their business model. In
California, the state fight over worker classification began with Dynamex
87

Erin Mulvaney, New Jersey Pursues Lyft on Taxes, Keeping Pressure on Gig Model,
BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 5, 2010, 1:03 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/new-jersey-pursues-lyft-on-taxes-keeping-pressure-on-gig-model; Chris Opfer,
Uber Hit With $650 Million Employment Tax Bill in New Jersey, BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 14,
2019, 4:31 PM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/uber-hit-with650-million-employment-tax-bill-in-new-jersey?context=article-related.
88
Healey v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 2084CV01519-BLS1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Mar. 25,
2021); Kate Conger & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Massachusetts Sues Uber and Lyft Over the
Status of Drivers, N.Y. TIMES (July 14, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/14
/technology/massachusetts-sues-uber-lyft.html.
89
Conger & Wakabayashi, supra note 88.
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See 20 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1521–23.
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Josefa Velasquez & Claudia Irizarry Aponte, NYC Set to Pass Food Delivery App Laws
Securing Workers Minimum Pay, Bathrooms and More, CITY (Sept. 22, 2021, 12:38 PM),
https://www.thecity.nyc/work/2021/9/22/22687983/nyc-landmark-food-deliveryworker-pay-bathrooms.
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See generally 20 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE §§ 1521–24.

2022]

COMMENT

295

Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct.94 There, a delivery driver for Dynamex,
a national courier, claimed that he was misclassified as an independent
contractor.95 Drivers set their own schedules and could reject specific
deliveries but were required to notify the company about their
schedule and delivery rejections.96 Drivers also wore Dynamex
uniforms and drove in Dynamex-labeled trucks.97 The Supreme Court
of California considered three different tests for determining if a
worker is an employee or independent contractor.98 The court
ultimately settled on the ABC test of independent contractors, which
requires employers to show that: (A) the employer does not control or
direct the performance of the work; (B) the work is outside the usual
course of the business; and (C) the worker typically performs the work
in an independently established trade, occupation, or business.99
Applying the test, the court determined that the workers were
employees because the employer could not show elements B and C;
therefore, the court held that making deliveries was not work outside
the usual course of business, and the workers did not perform their
trade independent of Dynamex.100
After the Dynamex decision, the California legislature immediately
went to work on a bill codifying the ABC test. Assembly Bill 5 (“AB5”)
incorporated the ABC test into California law. The bill was introduced
on December 3, 2018, and became effective January 1, 2020.101 The
backlash from gig-work companies was immediate. Uber and Lyft
refused to convert their drivers to employees, leading to a lawsuit from
the California Attorney General.102 The companies also warned they
would leave the state if AB5 remained in effect.103
To fight back against AB5 and lawsuits from the California
Attorney General, gig-work companies used a California voter
94

Dynamex Operations W., Inc. v. Superior Ct., 416 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2018).
Id. at 9.
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Id. at 8.
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See id. at 30 n.20, 33–36.
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Id. at 35–36.
100
Dynamex, 416 P.3d at 40–42.
101
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See generally People v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. CGC-20-584402, 2020 Cal. Super.
LEXIS 152 (Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 10, 2020).
103
Sara Ashley O’Brien, Uber and Lyft Get Reprieve from Court, Won’t Shut Down in
California for Now, CNN (Aug. 20, 2020, 4:35 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/20
/tech/uber-lyft-california-shutdown/index.html.
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referendum to put Proposition 22 on the ballot.104 Proposition 22
would explicitly permit gig workers to be classified as independent
contractors.105 Uber and other companies spent over $200 million on
voter outreach to support the measure, making it the most expensive
referendum vote ever in the United States.106 Ultimately, their efforts
were successful: Proposition 22 passed with 58 percent voter
approval.107
Shortly after their victory, gig-work companies made clear their
intention to replicate the Proposition 22 playbook nationwide.108
“You’ll see us more loudly advocate for new laws like Prop 22,” Uber
CEO Dara Khosrowshahi told investors, and DoorDash CEO Tony Xu
issued a statement saying: “We’re looking ahead and across the
country, ready to champion new benefits structures that are portable,
proportional, and flexible.”109 Already, gig-work companies have plans
in place to run a ballot initiative campaign similar to Proposition 22 in
Massachusetts.110 “If the coalition is successful [in their ballot initiative
petition], Massachusetts voters will decide [in 2022] whether gig
workers should be considered independent contractors.”111
But one year after Proposition 22’s approval, a California state
Superior Court held that the proposition was unconstitutional and
unenforceable as an infringement on legislative power and a violation
of the rule that referenda must cover only one subject.112 Much like
the larger fight over gig-worker classification, the fight over
Proposition 22 is far from over: a pro-Proposition 22 organization, the

104
Margot Roosevelt & Suhauna Hussain, Prop. 22 Is Ruled Unconstitutional, a Blow
to California Gig Economy Law, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 20, 2021, 10:22 PM),
https://www.latimes.com/business/story/2021-08-20/prop-22-unconstitutional.
105
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BLOOMBERG L. (Nov. 8, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-laborreport/election-day-gave-uber-and-lyft-a-whole-new-road-map.
109
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110
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Employee Status, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/04
/business/gig-workers-massachusetts.html.
111
Id.
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Castellanos v. State, No. RG21088725, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 7285, at *16–18
(Cal. Super. Ct. Aug. 20, 2021).
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Protect App-based Drivers & Services Coalition, has already appealed
the Superior Court’s ruling.113
The push and pull on the federal level between administrations
and the fights at the state level show that the question of employment
classification is highly politicized and subject to change from year to
year. For gig workers, especially those living paycheck to paycheck,
these fights may ultimately benefit them (or not), but they offer little
practical assistance in the interim if they remain locked out of
remedies provided by employment law. Consumer protection law can
fill this gap.
B. Using Consumer Protection Law to Regulate Wage Theft and
Employment Misrepresentations as Unfair and Deceptive Practices
There is some recent precedent for using consumer protection
statutes barring unfair and deceptive practices to regulate those same
violations when they occur against gig workers. The recent cases span
different political administrations, and regulators have brought
actions both federally and at the state level. Despite their many
statutory differences, the state statutes share five common purposes:
(1) to make victims whole for their losses; (2) to punish bad actors who
commit the prohibited acts; (3) to allow for consumers to bring their
claims, particularly when legal fees may exceed the actual damages; (4)
to incentivize attorneys to take on consumer protection cases; and (5)
to deter future fraud, and deceptive and unfair business practices.114
In the most recent example, in 2021, the FTC alleged that
Amazon violated Section 5(a) of the FTCA’s bar on deceptive business
practices by telling their drivers that they would receive tips, when, in
fact, the tips went to their base wages.115 The Complaint referred to
Amazon drivers as “consumers [that] can sign up as drivers to deliver
products to Amazon customers.”116 The Complaint alleged that
Amazon misappropriated $61 million of tips from hundreds of

113

Maeve Allsup, Prop 22 Backers Appeal Ruling Striking California Gig Worker Law (1),
BLOOMBERG L. (Sept. 23, 2021, 10:16 AM), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/us-lawweek/prop-22-backers-appeal-ruling-striking-california-gig-worker-law; Notice of
Appeal, Castellanos v. State, 2021 Cal. Super. LEXIS 7285 (Cal. Super. Aug. 20, 2021)
(No. RG21088725).
114
Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical Analysis
of Attorney’s Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483, 499
(2008).
115
Amazon Complaint, supra note 63, at 12.
116
Id. at 2.
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drivers.117 To support the allegations, the Complaint cited Amazon’s
advertising and company materials, which stated that drivers would
keep 100 percent of the tips, while actually taking those tips and
counting them toward base wages, to make out a claim of deceptive
trade practices.118
Further, the Complaint alleged that Amazon’s terms of service for
drivers “promised to ‘provide [drivers] with any tips [they] earn’” and
“promise[d] that ‘Amazon will pass through any tips payable to
you.’”119 The Complaint also made out a claim of deceptive practices
towards the customer-consumers, who were also told their tip money
would be paid as tips to the drivers.120 Allegedly “[w]hen customers
click[ed] on the recommended tip amount, the next screen
explain[ed] that ‘100% of tips are passed on to your courier.’”121
The lawsuit was settled swiftly—within a year—when Amazon
agreed to pay $61.7 million to make drivers whole.122 Additionally, the
settlement barred Amazon from changing driver compensation
without receiving drivers’ informed consent.123 The Consent Order
also provided for continued monitoring and recordkeeping
requirements for Amazon for information relating to the settled
charges.124 The court ordered Amazon to provide a compliance report
within one year, keep records of systems and procedures used to
process driver tips as well as any advertisements concerning driver tips
for ten years, and maintain those records for five years.125
The FTC also used the FTCA to bring a false and deceptive claims
case against Uber in 2017.126 In its 2017 Complaint, the FTC alleged
that Uber misled drivers with false and deceptive claims about their
117
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Trade Comm’n v. Uber Techs., Inc., No. 17-cv-00261 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 19, 2017)
[hereinafter Uber Complaint].
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earning potential on the platform and the details of its vehicle
financing plans.127 Notably, the FTC referred to Uber drivers as
“entrepreneurial consumers who are transportation providers” in their
Complaint.128 The Complaint also noted that Uber classified their
drivers as independent contractors.129 The Complaint defined Uber as
a company that “distributes a mobile software application” which
connects driver-consumers to passenger-consumers.130
The Complaint alleged that Uber overstated the wages that
drivers make on the platform in advertising communications on their
website and posted to other sources, such as Craigslist.com.131 For
example, postings to Craigslist advertised hourly driver earnings of $21
per hour in New Jersey and $25 per hour in Philadelphia, while actually
fewer than 30 percent of New Jersey drivers made that much money
and fewer than 10 percent of Philadelphia drivers made that wage.132
Additionally, it alleged that Uber made deceptive statements to driverconsumers relating to their car leasing programs.133 Through
recruiting advertisements, Uber stated that drivers could rent cars for
as little as $119 per week and with unlimited mileage.134 In reality, the
Complaint alleged the leases cost at least $200 per week, and each lease
had an annual mileage cap of around 37,500 miles, constituting a
deceptive practice.135
Uber settled with the FTC within the same month for $20
million.136 The settlement also included an Order that prohibits Uber
from making “false, misleading, or unsubstantiated representations” to
drivers about driver income, vehicle leasing, or financing offers.137 The
Order also required Uber to save records relating to the charges for
127
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nine years and save each record for five years.138 Further, the court
retained jurisdiction to monitor compliance with the Order and, if
necessary, request further information from the company.139
One recent case that the D.C. Attorney General brought against
Doordash for similar allegations of wage misrepresentation shows the
limits of regulating gig work where statutes have narrow definitions of
“consumer.” In District of Columbia v. Doordash, Inc., the District alleged
violations of D.C.’s Consumer Protection Procedures Act for deceptive
trade practices.140 In particular, it alleged that Doordash told both
consumers and their workers that tips would go to the workers; instead,
Doordash used them to pay base wages.141 The District used
Doordash’s communications to consumers that their tips would go 100
percent to drivers as evidence of the deception because, allegedly, the
tips were actually used to subsidize the workers’ base wages.142 Of note,
the Complaint differentiated between “consumers” of the Doordash
service and Doordash delivery “workers” or “Dashers,” rather than
including the workers themselves as consumers as well.143 The
Complaint was very likely precluded from including drivers as
consumers due to the D.C. statute’s definition of “consumer and
consumer goods” as goods and services for “personal, household, or
family purposes.”144
The suit settled for $2.5 million within a year, with $1.5 million
going to affected workers, $250,000 to local charities, and the
settlement mandating that Doordash pay tips properly going forward
and inform consumers of where exactly their monies go.145 The
settlement also included that Doordash would pay $750,000 to the
District of Columbia to reimburse it for the investigation and litigation
expenses connected to the case.146
138

Uber Order, supra note 137, at 7–8.
Id.
140
Doordash Complaint, supra note 9, at 1.
141
Id. at 1–3, 7.
142
Id. at 3, 7.
143
Id. at 2.
144
D.C. CODE § 28-3901(a)(2)(B) (2022).
145
Press Release, Off. of the Att’y Gen. for D.C., AG Racine Reaches $2.5 Million
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While suit was brought on behalf of deceived customerconsumers, part of the settlement paid the affected workers.147
Although this case was successful, it shows the inherent limits to
regulatory effectiveness where statutory definitions limit who can have
a cause of action. If the D.C. statute had broader definitions of
consumers, as this Comment suggests, the suit could have named both
the customers and the workers as consumers, making for a stronger
claim.
The above cases demonstrate that consumer protection law can
be used effectively to bring justice for gig workers otherwise left out by
employment statutes. The D.C. case highlights the limits of consumer
protection law where its scope is too narrow. These statutes can be
improved and used effectively to regulate gig work by broadening the
definition of consumer and including a strong private right of action.
Admittedly, these cases all settled and therefore did not create
precedent. Still, using consumer protection laws, regulators were able
to extract large settlements and make affected workers whole—more
than what is possible with statutes that exclude gig workers.
III. FEATURES OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAWS THAT WORK WELL
Regulatory efforts, as well as scholarship, have shown that certain
features of consumer protection law can be helpful in regulating gigwork companies. This Part will look at two such features: (1) broad
definitions of consumers and prohibited business practices and (2)
robust private rights of action—showing that even laws without these
features may be modified to serve as an enforcement tool in the new
gig economy.
A. Broad Definitions of Consumers and of Prohibited Business Practices
A broad definition of the “consumer” allows state attorney
generals and regulators to seamlessly bring suits against gig-work
companies who engage in unfair or deceptive practices towards their
workers. Statutes that deploy broad definitions of unfair and deceptive
practices, without excepted industries or classifications, offer a viable
tool to police the gig economy. For instance, California’s Consumer
Privacy Act defines a consumer as “a natural person who is a California
resident.”148 Likewise, California’s Unfair Competition Law’s (UCL),

147
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“‘scope is broad,’ and its coverage is ‘sweeping.’”149 The UCL prohibits
inter alia, “unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act[s] or practice[s]
and unfair, deceptive, untrue or misleading advertising . . . .”150 “Any
person who engages, has engaged, or proposes to engage in unfair
competition may be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction.”151
Moreover, the law grants the court authority to appoint a receiver
to guard against repeated violations and to make any victim whole.152
By focusing on the broad definitions of business practices, the UCL
allows for coverage in employment contexts—including claims for
unpaid wages.153
Likewise, by allowing for remedies to be granted to “person[s] of
interest,” the law leaves open remedies, such as back wages for
employees who were victims of unfair business practices.154 The law is
also clear in that it allows a broad cause of action for any “person,”
defined as “natural persons, corporations, firms, partnerships, joint
stock companies, associations and other organizations of persons.”155
Importantly, the UCL has been held to give employees a cause of
action for unfair and deceptive business practices relating to their
employment.156 Further, the UCL allows for punishment of violations

149
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which are “unlawful”—meaning unlawful under any other statute.157
Under the UCL, a practice can be prohibited “as ‘unfair’ or ‘deceptive’
even if not ‘unlawful.’”158 This allows the UCL to operate with great
flexibility and “permit[s] tribunals to enjoin on-going wrongful
business conduct in whatever context such activity might occur.”159
FTC enforcement actions have also treated gig workers as
“consumers” of gig company platforms.160 FTCA Section 5(a) gives the
FTC enforcement power against “[u]nfair methods of competition in
or affecting commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or
affecting commerce,” and gives the courts the right to remedy
consumers harmed by those violations.161 The FTC has applied this
authority broadly, bringing claims for violations perpetrated against
gig workers, because the acts “affect commerce.”162 Again, by focusing
on the unlawful acts, and defining them broadly, regulators are given
latitude to apply the law to unfair acts which affect employees or even
independent contractor “consumers” of gig economy platforms.163
The FTCA was “drafted broadly” to encompass not just anti-trust
violations but also “practices that the Commission determines are
against public policy for other reasons.”164 As the Court highlighted in
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., “[i]t is important to note the generality of
these standards of illegality; the proscriptions in § 5 are flexible[,] ‘to
be defined with particularity by the myriad of cases from the field of
business.’”165 In line with these goals, the FTC has rulemaking
authority under the FTCA to create rules, such as to define which
practices are unfair or deceptive.166
Like California’s UCL, the FTCA’s unfair practice definition is
broad and inclusive of even unfair practices which are not yet
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Clerkin v. MyLife.com, Inc., No. C 11-00527 CW, 2011 WL 3607496, at *6 (N.D.
Cal. Aug. 16, 2011) (“Violation of almost any federal, state or local law may serve as
the basis for a UCL claim.”).
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Paulus v. Bob Lynch Ford, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 4th 659, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
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See, e.g., Amazon Complaint, supra note 63; Uber Complaint, supra note 126.
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15 U.S.C. § 45.
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See id.; Amazon Complaint, supra note 63; Uber Complaint, supra note 126.
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Id.
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FTC v. LeadClick Media, LLC, 838 F.3d 158, 167–68 (2d Cir. 2016) (quoting
Ind. Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 454 (1986)).
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380 U.S. 374, 384–85 (1965).
166
See 15 U.S.C § 57a.
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otherwise illegal.167 Moreover, the statute provides that the FTC may
consider public policy in determining which practices should be
barred under the Act.”168
In the FTC’s 2017 Complaint against Uber for unfair and
deceptive practices, the FTC referred to Uber drivers as
“entrepreneurial consumers who are transportation providers.”169 The
Complaint did so while also noting that Uber classified their drivers as
independent contractors.170 In a show of regulatory consistency, the
FTC in its 2021 Complaint against Amazon also referred to the
Amazon Flex platform delivery drivers similarly as “consumers [that]
can sign up as drivers to deliver products to Amazon customers.”171
The FTC has this flexibility of enforcement because the FTC is not
limited to a narrow definition of consumer; instead, they can regulate
unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.172
Just as broad definitions are very helpful to allow for gig economy
workers to bring claims, similar laws in other jurisdictions have been
construed to exclude workers from the definition of “consumers.” For
instance, some consumer protection laws, such as D.C.’s Consumer
Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), limit the definition of consumers
to buyers of goods and services for the “personal, household, or family
purposes.”173 In Stone v. Landis Constr. Co., the D.C. Court of Appeals
considered a case where the appellant was a master plumber who
applied for a plumbing job with the appellee.174 After being passed
over for the job, the appellant filed claims against the appellee, which
included violations of the D.C. CPPA.175 The trial court dismissed
those claims.176 In reviewing appellant’s CPPA claims, the D.C. Court
of Appeals considered whether appellant could be a “consumer” as
167
See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187, 1194 (10th Cir. 2009); Paulus v. Bob
Lynch Ford, Inc., 139 Cal. App. 4th 659, 678 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006); 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)
(defining an unfair practice as an “act or practice [that]causes or is likely to cause
substantial injury to consumers which is not reasonably avoidable by consumers
themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to
competition.”).
168
15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
169
Uber Complaint, supra note 126, at 3.
170
Id. at 5.
171
Amazon Complaint, supra note 63, at 2.
172
15 U.S.C. § 45(a).
173
D.C. CODE § 28-3901(a)(2)(B) (2022).
174
120 A.3d 1287, 1288 (D.C. 2015).
175
Id.
176
Id.
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defined by the CPPA and concluded that he could not be; therefore,
he failed to state a claim.177 The court reviewed the statutory
definitions of consumer and consumer goods and concluded that to
hold appellant as a consumer based on the definitions “would involve
the contortion of normal language.”178 The court reached this
conclusion because “[e]mployment, properly understood, is not used
‘for personal, household, or family purposes’” and because
“employment [does not] naturally fall even within the definition of
‘goods and services,’” as “[e]mployment produces goods and
services.”179
The D.C. Court of Appeals went even further in limiting the scope
of who is a harmed consumer under the CPPA in Shaw v. Marriott Int’l,
Inc.180 In that case, the appellants brought claims under the CPPA
relating to hotel stays incurred during a business trip.181 Interpreting
the CPPA’s definition of “consumer goods,” the court held that
because “[b]oth [appellants] stayed in the hotels to further the
business purposes of their employers. They did not engage in
consumer transactions within the meaning of the Act and [were] not
entitled to its protections.”182
Given the holdings of Stone and Shaw, it makes sense that when
D.C. sought to use the CPPA statute against Doordash for allegedly
misappropriating customers’ tips intended for drivers, the D.C.
Attorney General only included the customers as consumers.183 This is
likely because, given the holdings of each of these cases, they realized
that they faced an uphill battle based on the statutory definitions of
“consumer” and “consumer goods” as the cases essentially foreclose on
such a cause of action.184 The Attorney General was limited to
classifying the customers as “consumers” because it would be difficult
to argue that the Doordash workers utilized the Doordash platform for
services for “personal, household, or family purposes.”185 That being
said, through settlement of the case, the Attorney General was
177

Id. at 1289–92.
Id. at 1290.
179
Id.
180
605 F.3d 1039, 1041 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
181
Id. at 1044.
182
Id.
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Doordash Complaint, supra note 9, at 1–2.
184
See, e.g., Stone v. Landis Constr. Co., 120 A.3d 1287, 1288, 1291–92 (D.C. Cir.
2015); Shaw v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 605 F.3d 1039, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 2010).
185
D.C. CODE § 28-3901(a)(2)(B) (2022).
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ultimately allowed to make the drivers whole, even though the
customer-consumers were the main subjects of the cause of action.186
Therefore, there still seems to be merit in pursuing these types of
violations, working creatively within the statutory limitations, even in
jurisdictions with limiting language.
This type of limiting language is also present in New York City’s
consumer protection law. There, the law limits the definition of
“consumer” to a “purchaser or lessee or prospective purchaser or
lessee of the consumer goods or services or consumer credit, including
a co-obligor or surety.”187 Consumer goods and services are defined as
those “which are primarily for personal, household or family
purposes.”188
Luckily, the problems with definitions are not intractable. State
laws can be amended to be more inclusive and cover unfair and
deceptive business practices, even within the workplace. With the
expansion of the gig economy, and concerns regarding fair treatment
of those workers, state legislatures interested in filling this regulatory
void should look to this option.189
B. Private Rights of Action with Meaningful Punitive Damages and
Attorney Fees Without Procedural Hurdles
While all fifty states offer a procedural cause of action for
individuals to sue under their state consumer protection law, some
states impose special hurdles which consumers must clear to make out
a successful claim, or limit the scope of violations a consumer may take
up.190 Additionally, the FTCA does not have a private right of action at
all.191 Private rights of action are important because they make it so
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Doordash Order, supra note 145, at 5.
N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 20-701(d).
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See generally Sydney Brownstone, Gig Economy Explosion: 53 Million American
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(Sept.
5,
2014),
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that an aggrieved party does not need to rely on government agencies
which may lack resources or have other priorities.192
History bears some of this out. It was criticism of the FTC and its
alleged resource deficit and mismanagement in the 1960s that led
states to pass their own Little-FTC Acts, with private rights of action, to
fill in the gaps lefts by the perceived failures of the FTC at the time.193
Private rights of action, in concert with treble damages, other punitive
damages, and legal fee awards incentivize harmed workers to seek
justice and attorneys to represent what may not otherwise be lucrative
cases.194
1. The Importance of Heightened Damages and Attorney
Fees
In explaining why New Jersey initially passed its consumer
protection law, which included awards of treble damages195 and

192

See Leah Nylen, FTC Suffering a Cash Crunch as it Prepares to Battle Facebook,
POLITICO (Dec. 10, 2020, 6:50 PM), https://www.politico.com/news/2020/12/10/ftccash-facebook-lawsuit-444468 (reporting on internal FTC emails in which “Executive
Director David Robbins said the agency would face a period of ‘belt tightening’ to cut
costs — and that filing fewer cases and trimming litigation expenses must be on the
table.”); Debra Pogrund Stark & Jessica M. Choplin, Does Fraud Pay? An Empirical
Analysis of Attorney’s Fees Provisions in Consumer Fraud Statutes, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 483,
490 (2008) (“With limited resources, the FTC clearly can not respond to so many
consumer complaints each year.”). Even where agencies do have the resources, the
focus may instead be on a priority other than remedies for gig workers. See, e.g., Scott
Ferguson, House Committees Seek to Spend Millions on Cybersecurity, BANK INFO SEC. (Sept.
15,
2021),
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Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really LittleFTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 167 (“By 1969 denouncement of the FTC had reached
its zenith with publication of critical reports from ‘Nader’s Raiders,’ the American Bar
Association, and Professor Richard Posner …. It was the perceived inadequacies of
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See Lettenmaier v. Lube Connection, Inc., 741 A.2d 591, 593 (N.J. 1999) (“The
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Treble damages are civil penalties in a statute that permit or require a court to
award up to three times damages to a winning plaintiff.
Treble Damages,
INVESTOPEDIA, https://www.investopedia.com/terms/t/trebledamages.asp
(last
updated Apr. 27, 2022). One such example is D.C.’s Consumer Protection Procedures
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attorney’s fees, then-Governor Cahill’s Press Release stated that the
legislature had done so to “provide ‘easier access to the courts for the
consumer, . . . increase the attractiveness of consumer actions to
attorneys and . . . also help reduce the burdens on the Division of
Consumer Affairs.”‘196
Likewise, the Supreme Court of South Carolina noted the public
policy reason for rewarding attorney’s fees as “[a]llowing plaintiffs who
successfully pursue an action under the [South Carolina law] to
recover their attorney’s fees encourages individuals to pursue litigation
to protect the public interest.”197 Furthermore, in explaining why it is
justified for attorney’s fees at times to exceed the actual damages in a
consumer protection case, the Michigan Court of Appeals noted that
“[i]n consumer protection [cases], the monetary value of the case is
typically low . . . . [I]f attorney fee awards in these cases do not provide
a reasonable return, it will be economically impossible for attorneys to
represent their clients.”198 The court further lamented that in such a
situation “practically speaking, the door to the courtroom will be
closed to all but those with either potentially substantial damages, or
those with sufficient economic resources to afford the litigation
expenses involved.”199
Another compelling public policy goal of these sorts of damages
is to punish companies who engage in unfair and deceptive practices
towards consumers.200 Further, the possibility of stiff penalties
disincentives bad behavior on behalf of gig-work companies who would
otherwise be unlikely to be deterred due to their economic power.201

Act which allows for the court to grant a prevailing plaintiff “[t]reble damages, or
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This is particularly important in a space where they are not subject to
traditional employment laws, and their penalties.
While laws like D.C.’s CPPA succeed in fortifying the private cause
of action with an extensive penalty structure, other state statutes—such
as New York’s—fail in this regard. New York’s consumer protection
law nominally allows for treble damages at the court’s discretion, but
those damages may not “exceed three times the actual damages up to
one thousand dollars.”202 Furthermore, treble damages may only apply
“if the court finds the defendant willfully or knowingly [committed the
violation].”203
While courts have held that New York’s statute allows for punitive
damages as well, the courts set a high bar to award them.204 “[P]unitive
damages [are only to be awarded] where the conduct of the party
[being] held liable ‘evidences a high degree of moral culpability, or
where the conduct is so flagrant as to transcend mere carelessness, or
where the conduct constitutes willful or wanton negligence or
recklessness.’”205
It is noteworthy that there is an ongoing effort in the New York
legislature to amend §349(h)’s treble damage limit.206 New York
Senate Bill 2407-C would eliminate the law’s $1,000 cap, instead
allowing judges to award damages up to their discretion for willful or
knowing violations.207 An increase in these penalties should go a long
way towards fulfilling the goals of the penalties to serve as incentives to
bring cases and deterrents for companies who may engage in unfair or
deceptive business practices.
2. The Impediment of Enhanced Elements for Private
Consumer Actions
Additionally, statutory or common law hurdles must be removed
for a consumer right of action to be effective. For instance, New York’s
statute has been held to require that “[Plaintiffs] must demonstrate
202
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that the acts or practices have a broader impact on consumers at
large.”208 In Elacqua v. Physicians’ Reciprocal Insurers, the Appellate
Division Third Department (a division of New York’s intermediate
appellate court) found that an insurer’s failure to notify its customers
of their right to independent counsel in claims which “give[] rise to a
conflict of interest between an insurer and its insured” constituted a
deceptive practice under the law.209 Further, because the deceptive
practice “was not an isolated incident, but a routine practice that
affected many similarly situated insureds,” the court held that it
satisfied the requirement that the act have a broader impact on the
public at large.210 Whereas a broader public impact was not found in
Stegich v. Saab Cars USA.211 In that case, the plaintiff alleged that a car
dealer failed to disclose a pre-purchase repair.212 The plaintiff,
however, was unable to show that the failure to disclose “was part of a
pattern of similar conduct directed at the public generally” to satisfy
the broader public impact element.213 Therefore, the plaintiff’s claim
failed.214
While this may not seem like a difficult standard, blocking out
consumers who are unable to make out a nexus between their injury
and a broader public impact is problematic, especially in the case of
gig workers who have limited legal avenues to address their claims. For
example, if a platform promised a gig worker a wage of $30 per hour
but actually paid less than the minimum wage, unless that worker could
show broader public impact, she would be unable to bring suit under
New York’s consumer protection law for want of this element, unable
to bring suit under the FTCA for lack of a private right of action, and
unable to bring suit under the FLSA for failure to pay the minimum
wage because she is an ineligible independent contractor.215
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Moreover, the requirement to investigate and show a business’s
overall practices can be a burden “so time-consuming and expensive
as to make individual consumer redress impossible.”216 Such a
requirement, and those like it, chill litigation by imposing a higher bar
to worker-consumers’ claims. For a consumer cause of action to be
effective, it must be accessible for the average consumer. That means
removing any additional barriers to recovery, such as New York’s public
impact requirement.
IV. OPPORTUNITIES AND POTENTIAL OBSTACLES
Consumer protection law as an enforcement tool has some
promise, but it is not without its inherent limitations. This Part will
review some of the overall advantages to utilizing these laws as well as
some potential drawbacks.
A. Quick Remedies
The Doordash, Amazon, and Uber cases settled quickly for big
money with binding terms on the companies to prevent future
violations.217 The Doordash and Amazon cases settled within one year,
while the Uber case settled in only one month.218 The cases settled for
a combined $84 million, with over $80 million going towards
compensating workers.219
Additionally, by using consumer protection laws, the government
agencies involved in these cases were able to secure additional binding
relief.220 For instance, Doordash was required to ensure that
“consumer tips are distributed in their entirety to the [delivery
Further, Doordash was required to “provide to
workers].”221
[customer-consumers] for each delivery order an itemized summary of
charges, including, but not limited to, item costs, tips paid, service fees,

216
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and taxes” as well as provide to the delivery drivers “an itemized
summary of the total payment for the delivery order, including base
pay, tips paid and any promotional payments” for each order.222
While some may argue that Doordash’s settlement—which does
not admit to any wrongdoing and is non-precedential—will have
limited impact, surely it is still a strong deterrent to similarly situated
companies that Doordash had to pay out $2.5 million and faced
extensive bad publicity.223 Moreover, both the Amazon and Uber
settlements included agreements by the companies to submit to
continued monitoring by the government and mandated
recordkeeping.224
By using the existing consumer protection statutes, federal and
local regulators were able to move quickly to provide both prophylactic
and retroactive remedies to affected workers.225 Rather than wade into
the ongoing debate regarding worker classification, using existing
causes of action, workers received relief quickly as companies settled
what must have been viable cases in their estimation. Furthermore,
“low pay[] [and] nonpayment or underpayment of their base pay and
tips” have been found to be among “the most pressing issues that appbased workers fac[e].”226 The highlighted cases all involve some form
of wage misrepresentation or misappropriation, showing that this
strategy is effective in resolving these types claims and providing both
monetary and injunctive relief to affected workers.227
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B. Already Existing Laws Need Only Minor Tweaks so Regulators Can
Move Fast as Gig-Work Companies Enter the Market.
Rather than requiring entirely new legislation, all fifty states
already have consumer protection laws that prohibit some form of
unfair and/or deceptive practices.228 This Comment suggests that by
expanding the definition of a consumer past a purchaser of only goods
and services for the “personal, household, or family purposes,” such as
in the D.C.’s CPPA, regulators would be able to monitor and
adjudicate far more instances of unfair and deceptive conduct,
including towards gig workers.229
The model for a state statute that does not have this problem
would be California’s UCL, which allows for a broad cause of action
for any unfair or deceptive practice, without limiting standing to
consumers of non-business goods and services.230 Likewise, the FTCA
could be mirrored becauses it also does not include restrictive
definitions of consumers.231 This strategy would be particularly fitting
as it would also be consistent with state statutes’ origins as Little-FTC
Acts.232
For instance, some have suggested that Uber may be susceptible
to claims of unfair and deceptive business practices in its assertions
surrounding insurance coverage for its drivers under California’s
UCL.233 This sort of claim, which involves the sale of insurance to be
used professionally rather than for “personal, household, or family
purposes,” is only possible under a statute like the UCL or the FTCA,
both of which focus broadly on prohibited acts without restrictive
definitions of “consumers.”234 Because the sale of car insurance to a
professional driver, to be used while driving professionally, falls
squarely outside of “personal, household, or family purposes,” an Uber
Doordash Complaint, supra note 9, at 10, 12; Doordash Order, supra note 145, at 4–5,
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228
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driver with that or a similar claim (perhaps a claim regarding a
misrepresentation of vehicle lease terms as in the Uber Complaint)
would be without a cause of action under the D.C. CPPA.235
It only makes sense that in D.C.’s complaint against Doordash for
withholding tips from delivery workers, the Attorney General chose to
label the customers as consumers.236 This is likely entirely due to the
statutory construction, which greatly restricts who is a consumer.237
While the D.C. CPPA serves as a model in terms of the types of
remedies offered to prevailing consumers—remedies such as treble
damages, punitive damages, and attorney fees—it blocks out large
swathes of injured consumers, such as gig workers, with its restrictive
definitions of consumers and consumer goods.238 This makes such a
statute difficult to use to regulate unfair and deceptive practices
perpetrated against gig workers, although it was used successfully in
the above-mentioned District of Columbia v. Doordash Complaint.239
Another modification that states can make to strengthen their
laws and make them more effective in deterring violations against gig
workers is to enhance their statutes’ available damages for prevailing
plaintiffs.240 One example of this is the current bill working its way
through the New York legislature to increase the amount of punitive
damages a judge may grant a winning plaintiff under its consumer
protection law.241 New York Senate Bill 2407-C would eliminate the
law’s $1,000 cap and allow for judges to award damages up to their
discretion for willful or knowing violations.242 This impactful change,
which would go a great way towards modernizing New York’s statute, is
accomplished simply by striking the words “to an amount not to exceed
three times the actual damages up to one thousand dollars.”243 This is
not such a Herculean task, and clearly the impact would be great
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because it is hard to imagine that the potential of a $1,000 fine would
have much of a deterrent impact on gig-work companies valued in the
billions.244 Moreover, as noted above, the greater the value of damages
possible, the greater the incentive for attorneys to take the cases.245
C. Consumer Protection Is Less Political Than Other Areas, So It May
Be Easier to Make Reforms and Use These Laws as Regulatory Tools
in the Gig Economy.
Federally, the FTC is designed to be a non-political, non-partisan
agency.246 It is governed by five commissioners whom the President
nominates and the Senate confirms to serve seven-year terms.247 As an
independent agency, FTC commissioners may not be removed for
political reasons.248 This structure has allowed for minority-party FTC
leadership to carry over even through presidential elections—such is
the case now where a majority of commissioners are Republican—and
will likely stay that way through more than half of Democratic
President Joe Biden’s first term (that is, unless commissioners
resign).249 One might think that such a composition would presage a
shift towards free market and business friendly regulations and away
from enforcement of gig-worker employment protections. With
relative consistency, however, the FTC has pursued these sorts of 5(a)
unfair and deceptive business practice claims against gig-work
companies, with similar actions versus Uber for misrepresenting
drivers’ wages and car leases in 2017 and now in 2021 versus Amazon
for misrepresenting drivers’ wages.
Richard A. Posner, a Circuit Court Judge and Law Professor who
started his career at the FTC, posits an explanation for this
244
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phenomenon, which seems so anachronistic to our hyper-partisan
climate, writing: “What is even more remarkable is that antitrust and
consumer protection have so far lost their traditional ideological
coloration that the FTC has become effectively bipartisan, in the sense
that changes from administration to administration in the policies of
the Commission are incremental rather than radical.”250
That being said, recent accusations of partisanship have flared up
surrounding the FTC.251 It does not seem as yet, however, that any
partisan issues have hampered the FTC from investigating and
pursuing claims for violations relating to gig workers.252 Further, that
all fifty states have some form of consumer protection law prohibiting
some variation of unfair and/or deceptive acts also indicates that all
states at least see consumer protection as a priority.253 But not all of
those laws are as strong as they could be, nor are all suited to be used
to protect gig workers due to various deficiencies.254 As noted above,
however, with relatively small tweaks, even the weaker state laws could
be effective in filling the enforcement void for gig workers.255
V. CONCLUSION
Consumer protection laws such as the FTCA and state and local
Little-FTC Acts can serve as effective regulatory tools for government
agencies interested in regulating the working conditions of gigeconomy workers. While the fight over classification continues to work
its way through state legislatures and state and federal courts, these
laws provide a solution for the enforcement gap created by gig worker
independent contractors’ ineligibility for protective laws such as the
FLSA, Title VII, ADA, and the ADEA—just to list a few.
250

Richard A. Posner, The Federal Trade Commission: A Retrospective, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
761, 764 (2005).
251
See Letter from Jim Jordan, Cathy McMorris Rodgers, and James Comer, U.S.
Reps., U.S. House of Reps., to Lina Khan, Chair, and Noah J. Phillips, Rohit Chopra,
Rebecca K. Slaughter, and Christine S. Wilson, Comm’rs, Fed. Trade Comm’n (July
29, 2021), https://republicans-judiciary.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07
/2021-07-29-JDJ-CMR-JC-to-FTC.pdf (alleging the FTC of “partisan changes [to]
position the Biden FTC to reshape radically the American economy”); see also Nihal
Krishan, EXCLUSIVE: Top Republicans Torch FTC for ‘Partisan Changes’ That Will Harm
Consumers, YAHOO! NEWS (July 29, 2021), https://news.yahoo.com/exclusive-toprepublicans-torch-ftc-182100552.html.
252
See Uber Complaint, supra note 126; see also Amazon Complaint, supra note 63.
253
CONSUMER PROTECTION IN THE STATES, supra note 56, at 9.
254
See id. at 1–4 (2018); supra Part III.
255
See supra Part IV.

2022]

COMMENT

317

While an imperfect solution, consumer protection laws work best
to protect gig workers where statutory language broadly defines unfair
and deceptive practices without restrictive definitions of consumers
that would exclude gig workers. Furthermore, statutes with strong
private rights of action that include punitive damages (often including
treble damages), attorney fees, and freedom from procedural or
substantive hurdles for consumers facilitate the laws’ usefulness for
protecting workers. Luckily, as this Comment suggests, even where
laws are not optimal today, with minor changes, they can be modified
to be more effective in regulating the gig economy.

